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aside the release entered into between appellant and respondent, 
Transnational Insurance Company, and to recover damages allegedly 
resulting from the accident between appellant and respondent, 
Raymond D. Kingsford. Respondent moved for Summary Judgment 
and this Motion was granted by the Honorable John F. Wahlquist by 
Judgment dated November 28, 1975. Appellants Petition for Rehear-
ing on the Motion for Summary Judgment was denied by Order dated 
February 18, 1976, Appellant then prosecuted her appqal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent seeks to have the Order of the District 
Court granting respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant, Carrie M. Carter , and respondent, Raymond D. 
Kingsford, were involved in an automobile accident in Ogden, Utah, on 
April 26, 1971 (R. 17, 114). Mrs . Carter was injured in the acci-
dent and sought treatment from her private physician, Dr. David P . 
Jahsman, on the day of the accident (R. 28). Dr. Jahsman diagnosed 
her injuries as a cervical strain, strain of the left shoulder and super-
ficial abrasions (R. 120). Mrs . Carter was hospitalized on the day 
following the accident until June 6, 1971 (R. 28), and was subsequently 
hospitalized again (R. 27-28). During this entire period, she was 
under the treatment of her private physician and other physicians who 
assisted her physician by means of consultation (R. 27). On July 14, 
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1971, appel lant executed a Release of Liabil i ty with a r ep re sen ta t ive 
of respondent , Transna t iona l Insurance Company (R. 112) and 
rece ived the se t t l ement of $3,334*09 (R. 135). Approximately one 
yea r l a t e r , appel lant noticed a r e c u r r e n c e of numbness in her r ight 
a r m and sought the aid of h e r physician (R. 112). She continued to be 
t r ea t ed by Dr . J a h s m a n until November of 1974 when she was seen by 
Dr# C. D. Van Hook (R. 121). Dr . Van Hook d iscovered that 
M r s . C a r t e r was suffering f rom a ce rv ica l herniated d isc (R. 14). In 
J anua ry of 1975 s u r g e r y was pe r fo rmed involving a fusion of the C-5 
and 6 d i scs (R. 32, 121). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS RULED THAT A 
RELEASE CANNOT BE SET ASIDE BASED UPON THE 
UNKNOWN CONSEQUENCES OF A KNOWN INJURY 
Reynolds v. M e r r i l l , 23 Utah 2d 155, 460 P . 2d 323 (1969), 
is the leading case in Utah on the i s sue of the grounds n e c e s s a r y to se t 
as ide a Re lease . The facts of that case a r e ex t r eme ly impor tan t to the 
disposi t ion of the ins tant ca se . That case a l so involved an automobile 
col l is ion, where in the plaintiff was injured and sought the t r e a t m e n t of 
his p r iva te physician. His physician diagnosed the plaintiff 's in jur ies 
3.S a r e c u r r e n c e of b u r s i t i s . Almost two months af ter the accident , a t 
the r eques t of the defendant 's insurance ad jus te r , the physician signed 
an Attending Phys ic ian ! s Report , where in he diagnosed the plaintiff 's 
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condition as traumatic bursitis of the right shoulder and traumatic 
myositis posterior neck muscles. One month later , the plaintiff 
signed a release and received $655. 56* Subsequently, the plaintiff's 
shoulder pains grew more severe and approximately six months follow-
ing the accident, he was hospitalized and tests revealed a herniated 
disc, A spinal fusion was performed resulting in a permanent partial 
disability. The plaintiff then brought suit to set aside the release-
The t r ia l court held that the plaintiff had lost all rights against the 
defendant by reason of the release and granted a summary judgment 
dismissing the complaint. This court reversed the trial court 's 
decision. In doing so, this court distinguished between an unknown 
injury and unknown consequences of a known injury. This court stated 
that the unknown injury can be a mutual mistake of fact and, conse-
quently, can be the basis for setting aside a release. The unknown 
consequences of a known injury are only a mistake of opinion and will 
not provide grounds for setting aside a release. The plaintiff had 
raised a mater ial issue of fact which should have been presented to 
the jury and this was the reason for reversing the tr ial court 's decision 
granting the Motion for Summary Judgment. It should be particularly 
noted that in the Reynolds case, the plaintiff's physician diagnosed his 
injury as a recurrence of bursi t is , obviously a preexisting condition. 
Thus, the lat ter discovery of a herniated disc was quite different from 
the original diagnosis. 
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In the instant case, the injuries suffered by the appellant are 
clearly unknown consequences of a known injury. The appellant's 
physician did not diagnose her injuries as a recurrence of any pre-
existing condition, .nor did he .make an incorrect diagnosis. He simply 
was not aware of the severity of the injuries which he did diagnose. 
The Affidavit of appellants physician, Dr. Jahsman, reveals that his 
impression at the time he first saw the appellant following the accident 
was that she had suffered a cervical strain, strain of the left shoulder 
and superficial abrasions (R. 120). Dr. Jahsman also states in his 
Affidavit that x-rays and analysis as of 1971 indicated a slight 
degenerative disc disease at C-5-6, but that he was confident that the 
appellant would respond to non-surgical treatment (R. 121). Thus, he 
clearly knew and so informed the appellant that she was suffering from 
neck injuries and injuries to her shoulder. Appellant states in her 
Affidavit that at the time she entered into the release she was aware of 
the permanent nature of the injury, believed the injury was merely a 
severe neck strain, but was not aware of the nature and extent of her 
injury (R. 112). What Dr. Jahsman and the appellant did not know was 
the ultimate severity of those injuries. Thus the la ter discovery o£ the 
degenerative disc and the resulting surgery was not an unknown injury, 
but merely the unknown consequences of the known injuries to the 
plaintiff1 s neck and upper back. The appellant's own Affidavit in this 
case, and that of her physician, clearly show that the appellant has 
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failed to raise a material issue of fact. Both Affidavits clearly 
reveal that the only thing unknown to the appellant and her physician 
would be the extent of the consequences of her known injuries and not 
any la ter discovered unknown injury (R. 112, 121). The tr ial judge 
correctly made this finding. In his memorandum decision, he stated: 
There can be no question that after the 
accident she knew and was informed that she 
had an injury to her neck. . . . This is with-
out a doubt a case in which a release has been 
given for a known neck injury, the future of 
which was speculative, and in the general 
belief that the plaintiff was recovering, but 
that the monies were paid for the risk of 
known recovery. The case is clearly distin-
guishable from Reynolds v. Merri l l , 23 Utah 2d, 
155, where the injury was not noted and not 
considered in its true light at the time. . . . 
If a release is good at all this release must be 
recognized. . . . Unquestionably, from Dr. 
Jahsman !s report to attorney Keith Henderson 
in the file, this is a "known injury where the 
result was not foreseeable11 and settled on that 
bas is . (R. 114-115) 
The tr ial judge's determination on this issue is correct and 
this court should affirm its decision. 
POINT n 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS THE PROPER DISPOSITION 
WHERE A PLAINTIFF'S OWN EVIDENCE REVEALS THAT 
THERE IS NO MATERIAL ISSUE OF FACT IN THE CASE 
As noted above, the respondents in this case are relying 
on the appellant's own evidence to support their position. The 
Affidavits of the appellant and her physician clearly reveal that the 
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injuries discovered subsequent to the release being executed were 
merely consequences of the injuries known to the appellant and her 
physician prior to the time that the release was executed. Thus, the 
appellant has failed to raise a material issue of fact which would pre-
clude the tr ial court from granting respondents1 Motion for Summary 
Judgment, The standard by which a summary judgment by the t r ia l 
court is reviewed by this court was set forth in the case of Frederick 
May & Company v. Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 368 P . 2d 266 (1962). That 
case involved a brokerage company suing to recover a broker !s 
commission for the sale of a business concern. The tr ial court granted 
a summary judgment to defendant and the plaintiff appealed. This court 
upheld the tr ial court !s action in granting the summary judgment and 
articulated the following standard to be used in reviewing such an action 
by the tr ial court: 
[l] To sustain a summary judgment, the 
pleadings, evidence, admissions and infer-
ences therefrom, viewed most favorably to 
the lower, must show that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact, and that the winner 
is entitled to a judgment as a mat ter of law. 
Such showing must preclude, as a mat ter of 
law, all reasonable possibility that the loser 
could win if given a tr ial . 
This court 's affirmance in that case was based largely on 
evidence produced by the plaintiffs, much as in the instant case. Here, 
the respondents are relying on the evidence produced by the appellant 
in her Affidavit. Since those Affidavits conclusively show that there is 
- 7 -
no m a t e r i a l i s sue of fact, i t is obvious that the appellant could not 
have preva i led in a t r i a l . There fore , the t r i a l cour t ' s act ion in 
grant ing respondents 1 Motion for Summary Judgment was c o r r e c t 
and should be affirmed by this cour t . 
That the t r i a l court1 s act ion was c o r r e c t becomes even m o r e 
apparen t af ter focusing on the purpose of the s u m m a r y judgment . As 
announced in Dupler v. Yates , 10 Utah 2d 251, 269, 351 P . 2d 624 (1960). 
That case deal t with an action by p u r c h a s e r s of i n t e r e s t s in oil wel ls 
to r e c o v e r damage for alleged fraud and decei t and b reach of a 
f iduciary re la t ionship by defendant. Defendant in suppor t of mot ion 
for s u m m a r y judgment produced admis sable evidence that p u r c h a s e r s 
w e r e induced to pu rchase the i r i n t e r e s t s in re l iance upon false r e p r e -
sentat ions made by the s e l l e r s and not by the defendant. The t r i a l 
cour t granted the motion for s u m m a r y judgment and the Utah Supreme 
Cour t aff irmed on the following b a s i s : 
[4] The p r i m a r y purpose of tb e^ s u m m a r y 
judgment p rocedure is to p i e r ce the al legat ions 
of the pleadings , show that t he re is no genuine 
i s sue of m a t e r i a l fact, although an i s sue may 
be ra i sed by the pleadings , and tha t the moving 
pa r ty is enti t led to judgment as a m a t t e r of law. 
[5] It is apparen t h e r e that the defendant has 
produced evidence that p i e r c e s the al legat ions 
of the complaint . The plaintiffs have not con-
t rover ted , explained o r des t royed that evidence 
by counteraffidavit o r o therwise . They have re l ied 
upon the i r amended complaint and the i r proposed 
amendment to the amended complaint . 
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This court went on to say that even though Rule 56, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure is not intended as a substitute for regular 
trial when there are disputed i ssues of fact, and that summary judgment 
should be invoked with caution; nevertheless , 
. . . where the moving party1 s evidentiary 
material is in itself sufficient and the 
opposing party fails to proffer any evidentiary 
matter when he is presumably in a position to 
do so, the courts should be justified in con-
cluding that no genuine i ssue of fact is present, 
nor would one be present at the trial. 
Here, appel lants own Affidavits have pierced the allegations 
of their pleadings. There is no genuine issue of material fact. The 
evidence is sufficient to warrant summary judgment. It is apparent 
that appellant, having failed to produce any evidentiary matter in 
contradiction of respondents' case , would not be able to present a 
genuine i ssue of fact at trial. Therefore, respondents being entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law, the trial court was correct in granting 
respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment and should be affirmed by 
this court. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court was correct in granting respondents1 
Motion for Summary Judgment in that there is no genuine i ssue of 
material fact and respondents are entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. 
Appellant's own Affidavits establish that: (1) at the time of 
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the release, both appellant and her physician were cognizant of the 
fact that she was suffering from neck and shoulder injuries; and (2)i 
that the injury of which appellant now complains, and by which she's 
attempting to set aside the release, is simply an unknown consequence 
of a known injury* 
This court has stated often that summary judgment is the 
proper disposition where a plaintiff's own evidence reveals that there 
is no mater ial issue of fact in the case. This court has also ruled 
that a release cannot be set aside based upon the unknown consequences 
of a known injury* 
Based upon the foregoing, the respondents urge this court 
to affirm the Order of the District Court granting respondents' Motion 
for Summary Judgment* 
Respectfully submitted, 
D. lGARtf CHRISTIAN, 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN 
520 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Respondents 
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